A zcm-knowledge idcnliiiaion scheme hill upon lhc so-called Pcrmud K m e l Pmblcm (F' KP) was proposed by Adi Shamir in 1989 111.
The Permuted Kernel Problem
We are using, as far as possible, the notations of [l] .
The PKP problem is the following :
Find : a permutation x over (I,..,n] such that A.V, = 0, where V, = ( v ,~) ) j = l , ,~, In the PKP identification scheme, each prover uses a public instance (p,A.V) of the above problem. The values p, A. V are generated as follows :
-p and A are fixed values agreed by the users (and can be used by several provers). We will here assume that A is of rank m and is generated under the form [A',I]. where A' is a fixed m x (n-rn) matrix and I is the m x m identity matrix. (As mentioned in [l] , this is not restrictive because both the prover and the verifier can apply Gaussian elimination to any m x n matrix wihout changing h e kernel).
-V (the public key of a prover) is generated from a random permutation fi and a random vector of the kernel of A (which serve as his secret key) in such a way that A.V, = 0.
To convince a verifier of his identity, a prover gives him evidence of his knowledge of a solution 1~ to the (p,A,V) inslance by using a zero-knowledge protocol, The detail of h i s protocol, which is the main subject of [I] , is outside the scope of this paper, since we are merely interested in rhe computational difficulty for an attacker of solving the (p,A,V) instance.
A time-memory trade-off for the PKP problem
Let (p, A, v) be an instance of the PKP problem generated as explained in Section 2. We are trying to find a permutation x such that A.V, = 0.
Using the notations introduced in Section 2, we can rewrite A.Vn = 0 as :
We denote by (1) to (m) the relations provided by the rows 1 to rn of the above matrix.
Note : in the Sequel we are sometimes using h e notation A=(aij) i=1..,,;j=laan instead of the above 'reduced' notauon A=[A,II: A=(a'i,) i=~.,m;j=l..n-m ta denote the elements of the A mamx.
We first try to solve the equations (1) to &), where k is a parameter of our algorithm ( m m ) . Because of the structure of the A matrix. these k relations involve only the n-m+k unknown values
Vx(1)' -.* vx(n-m+k).
We introduce an additional parametcr k' (such that W S n -m + k ) , which determines the amount of storage to be performed in the precomputation phase.
There are two main steps in the proposed searching mehod
Step1 : precomputation n! (n-k').
For each of the 7 possible values for h e ( V x ( l ) , ..., Vxw) ) k'-uple, we calculate the corresponding contributions :
to h e relations (1) to @). The cost of this precomputation step is -matrix-vector products. The storage required is about (n-k' )! k-uples. The average number of k-uples corresponding to a (bl, ,..&) value is -pmk.
We also introduce the convention that k'=O means : no precomputation.
Step 2 : exhaustive trial n'
We perform an exhaustive trid of the +possible values for the (vnw+l), ..., Vx(n-,,.,+k)) vector.
For each tried value, we calculate Lhe corresponding contributions tD the relations (1) to &) :
j=k'+l
We can now use the precompumtions of Step 1 to obtain a list of possible (Vx(l), .... Vnw)) k-uples. For each remaining (vn(l), ..., Vn (,,-,,,+k) ) vector, the still unsolved relations &+I) to (m) provide successively one single possible value for the numbers Vn(n-m+k+l) to Vx(,,).
At each stage of his process of extending a (Vn(l). .... vn(n.m+k)) candidate to a ( v x ( l ) . .._. Vn(n)) solution. it has to be checked that the obtained values are non repeating and belong to the (V1, .._, Vn] set. mis can be done in very few elementary operations. increases too much.
For a fixed value of k. the required amount of storage is an increasing function of k'; the time required is a decreasing function of k as long as k S (n-rn+k)/2 and I < pk (the first condition says that the time spent on the precomputation should not exceed the time spent on siep 2; the second condition says that the average number of k-uples corresponding to a (bl. ..., bk) value should be less than 1). Too large values Of n! (n-k)! -k' (such that h e two above conditions are not realised) are suboptimal, because they lead to an increased memory cost without reducing the time COSL.
4. Impact on the practical security of the PKP scheme Table 1 gives the time and memory costs, calculated in using (i) and (ii Table 2 gives the time and memory costs corresponding to the parameter values n=64; m=37; p=251 for some of the k and k' parameter values. Some of h e obtained time costs are substantially lower b a n the complexity of the best attack mentioned in [l] . For example, for k=8 and k'=ll. the obtained time cost is 2137 rnauix vector products, and the required storage is 2@ k'-uples. However, due to the very large values of the obtained time casts, the amcks summarised in Table 2 are cornpulationally infeasible.
Concluding remarks
IndependcntIy of our work, the security of the PKP problem has also been investigated by J. Ceorgiades and the results are summarized in [2] . His method, which is based on the resolution of quadratic equations, is less efficient in time cost ban the one described in this paper, but requires a negligible amount of storage to solve the PKP problem. We do not know whether both approaches can be combined efficiently.
